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South African historiography is ripe for change. Since the
emergence of revisionism in the 1960s, South African politics has
been studied using certain hitherto unquestioned assumptions. The
radical paradigm has been responsible for extraordinary insights
in South African political and historical analysis; however, also
it needs to be transcended in important ways. It is the aim of
this paper to subject these assumptions to critical scrutiny, and
to develop an alternative approach to the study of political
phenomena in South Africa - an approach from the perspective of
Apolitical morality'. To some extent, I will have to overstate my
case - most notably by underplaying the important dynamics of
conflict and coercion. I feel this is legitimate however, because
these issues have occupied, unchallenged, the centre stage in
political analysis in this country. After a review of the existing
literature and some theoretical comments, I will apply the notion
of Apolitical morality' to a specific historical context, viz.
township administration in South African cities during the 1950s.
A. Realism, functionalism and Hobbesianism: Common themes
in contemporary South African political analysis
During the 1970s, the prevailing * liberal' or ^reformist' approach
to South African political analysis was decisively dethroned by the
materialist assumptions of the revisionist school. In the last two
decades, the revisionists and their successors, the state-centric
theorists and the ideology-critics (all of whom I gather under the
term ^radical tradition'), have interpreted political reality from
several key assumptions:
a) Realism: The revisionists were methodological realists,
in the technical sense that they distinguished between several
layers of reality. Causal power was attributed to underlying,
usually invisible, structures and forces. Consequently,
revisionists adopted a posture which has been described as the
'hermeneutics of suspicion', a view that holds that actorsd do not
have direct access to the meaning of their discourse and practices,
and that our everyday meanings work to cover up a deeper kind of
intellegibility '. For this reason, methodological realists (and
The term is originally Paul Ricoeur's. It is discussed
by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow in Michel Foucault:
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, University of
Chicago Press,1983; p. 123.
especially those with a materialist bent) had very little respect
for what * ordinary people's consciousnesses have to say for
themselves'
For revisionists, social analysis was used to destroy putative
masks and illusions in a relentless effort at ^demystification'.
Thge revisionists' main theoretical innovation was their portrayal
of apartheid ideology was seen as a mask for more fundamental
practices, notably capitalist exploitation.
b) Function, structure and agency
A second claim made by revisionists was that underlying economic
forces were actually functional to the maintenance of racial
segregation 3. In the light of this assumption, revisionists have
concluded, illogically, that segregation has served the interests
of specific sectors of society. This argument contains two logical
fallacies: (1) the fallacy of division and (2) the fallacy of
imputation. We will comment briefly on these two problems.
First, as regards the fallacy of division 4: The claim that
something is functional to a system as a whole does not mean that
it is functional to a segment of the whole. Functionalism is a
form of teleological inquiry: social practices are explained with
reference to the systemic functions they serve. To reduce the
concept of systemic function to that of the function to serve the
interests of specific social sectors is quite unwarranted.
Second, this has often led to a confusion between interpretation
(saying what a policy or a practice means) and imputation
Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cvnical Reason. New York:
Verso Books, 1988. He provides an extended critique of
different kinds of ^cynical reason', most notably Marxism
and Freudianism.
A critique of the functionalism inherent in the
revisionist paradigm is provided in D. Posel, * Rethinking
the "race-class debate" in South African historiography',
in Social Dynamics, vol. 9, no. 1, 1983. Unfortunately
her analysis improves the revisionists' account merely
by adding the notion of *dysfunction', thus leaving the
theoretical constraints of the paradigm virtually intact.
The claim that a characteristic applicable to a whole is
also applicable to individual parts of the whole. An
analogy is the claim that the functional effect of AIDS
on population control in a society can be translated to
the interests of specific members of that society.
(attributing a particular motive to a social actor) 5. In
revisionist historiography, this illogical shift has often been
made. Despite revisionists' claims, the fact that racial
segregation was functional to capitalism does not imply that
segregation was introduced with the conscious motive of promoting
capitalism 6. The notion of function has been allowed to lapse
into the concept of individual motive.
From these logical errors, it was a short move to developing an
understanding of human motivation based on the notion of interest-
maximisation. According to revisionists, capitalists must be
analysed from the perspective that they are always busily promoting
their interests, making rational calculations, making alliances,
worrying about their labour supplies, and generally promoting the
conditions for accumulation of capital. This approach remained
^realist', since it was deemed that political phenomena were
reducible to *underlying interests'. Terms such as xcontrol',
* exploitation', *needs of capital', ^mobilised capital',
*onslaughts', * dominant and subordinate classes', * interests',
^material needs', *accumulation', ^domination' and ^hegemony'
became an insistent litany of any respectable radical social
research in South Africa. Political analysts have adopted, in
Peter Sloterdijk's terms, an attitude of cynical reason, ever-
intent on exposing layer upon layer of *egoisms, class privileges,
resentments, steadfastness of hegemonic powers'7.
I am endebted to Dave Christianson for this distinction.
This point is made by John Plamenatz, Man and Society
(Vol. 2), London: Longman, 1963; pp. 364-5, p. 367. In
the South African context, see Christopher Saunders, The
Making of the South African Past. Cape Town: David
Philip, 188; p. 188-9. Also Saul Dubow, Racial
Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa,
1919-1936. London: Macmillan Press, 1989; p. 8.
P. Sloterdijk, Ibid, p. 19. It should be noted that the
roots of * interest-based' theory lie deep in Western
political philosophy, since the writings of Hobbes, Locke
and Nietzsche. However, a different tradition also
exists, which emphasise politics as an ethical activity;
a tradition which includes Plato, Rousseau, Hegel,
Habermas and Arendt. South African historiography has
emphasised the former tradition, and ignored the latter.
One reason for this is an unacknowledged moral outrage
at the complacent and cosy accommodations which elites
seem to engender in the face of extreme social distress.
Such an outrage is largely valid; my point is that it
should not become an unexamined springboard for genuine
social analysis.
Historians such as Deborah Posel have challenged this emphasis on
economic interests , and urged that variables such as ideological
and political control, ethnicity, and individual leadership be
taken into account. Yet the Hobbesian interpretation of human
motivation remains common in radical South African political
analysis. We are left with a world populated by supremely self-
interested, competitive, calculating individuals - a conception
which has flourished in the fertile soil of unpalatable inequality
and racism in South Africa.
The generation of * state-centric theorists' of the 1980s asserted,
in reaction to the materialistic bias of the revisionists, that the
state was an actor in its own right 9. However, the Hobbesian
conception of motivation and meaning has remained, grounded firmly
in the unchallenged primacy of the concept of * interests'.
Therefore, as a theoretical improvement, this innovation was
limited in its significance. Only the dramatis personae changed;
the theme and tenor of the play remained the same. Furthermore,
although some theorists have recently moved away from a monolithic
conception of the state, and have analysed the important cleavages
within it, they still attribute an unwarranted degree of pragmatism
and expediency to state actors.
A second major improvement on the revisionist literature has been
a recent concern with questions of ideology and discourse 10.
8
. D. Posel, *Ibid', p. 61.
9
. An early example of this is Heribert Adam, Modernizing
Racial Domination, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1971. Recent examples are Mark Swilling and Mark
Phillips, *The. Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-
making structures and policy strategies in the South
African state', in Centre for Policy Studies, Policy
Perspectives 1989: South Africa at the End of the
Eighties. Johannesburg: CPS, 1989; and Steve Friedman,
*The National Party and the South African transition',
in R. Lee and L. Schlemmer (eds) , Transition to
Democracy. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991. The
entire ^ transition literature', centered around Phillippe
Schmitter and Guillermo O'Donnel, is grounded on an
interest-based theory of politics.
10
. For example, S. Dubow, Ibid, 1989; D. Posel, *The
language of domination, 1978-1983' in S. Marks and S.
Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race. Class and
Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, England:
Longman, 1987; and Adam Ashforth, The Politics of
Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; and Stanley Greenberg,
However, the realist, functionalist and Hobbesian assumptions are
rerained in these analyses. In all these studies, the realm of
meaning is only deemed interesting to the extent that it
purportedly justifies political or economic domination. Social
actors' beliefs and language are treated as ^mechanisms' and
^strategies' of political power, ^schemes of legimation ... to
achieve ... the objectives of power 11; and establishment
intellectuals are seen as engaged in * ideological projects' and
^tasks' which results in further ideological ^mystifications' 12.
The discourse-theorists provide no real reasons why the beliefs of
state actors should be regarded in this way, other than the
pervasive assumption that it is somehow functional to the
maintenance of certain power structures. Instead, discourse-
theorists simply rely on an abundant use of scare quotes to warn
us of the essential dubiousness of almost everything said by state
actors, and to indicate that these actors' point of view does not
represent reality in any meaningful sense. For Adan Ashforth, for
example, the discourse of Native Commissioners is illegitimate, in
whole or in part (Ashforth never makes clear), because such a
discourse has either (a) the effect, or (b) the function, or (c)
the purpose (again, Ashforth never clarifies) , of promoting state
power.
Because of these difficulties, the ^ discourse-theorists' implicitly
subscribe to a curious understanding of politics. Their critiques
of ideologies are deeply ambiguous. Why, exactly, should we peer
beyond social actors' express beliefs? Why should we subject such
beliefs to a 'hermeneutic of suspicion'? Exploring the latent
assumptions of a theoretical paradigm is always a tricky matter,
but there are important issues at stake. Hence I will briefly
consider two aspects of their implicit conception of political
meaning, viz. (1) their critique of the political effects of
ideology, and (2) their epistemological critique of ideology.
Regarding political effects: Simply showing that *the knowledge
of social realities' is somehow x integrally connected to the
formations of state power' 3 is simply not sufficient to challenge
the validity of historical beliefs and discourse. All kinds of
ideas affect all kinds of power relations in all kinds of (intended
or unintended) ways. The further argument that beliefs are
suspect because they promote certain interests does not really help
^Ideological struggles within the South African state',
in Marks and Trapido (eds), Ibid.
12
. S. Greenberg, *Ibid'; p. 394.
13 Ashforth, Ibid., p. 10.
matters. Does the presence of interests discredit beliefs per se?
Or is it the nature of the interests (i.e. * illegitimate
interests') that disqualify the validity of beliefs? And what
interests are legitimate anyway? Can we seriously expect social
actors, caught in a specific historical context, to have interests
different from the ones they had?
Regarding the epistemoloaical status of ideology: On the other
hand, discourse theorists also tend to question the epistemological
validity of social actors' truth claims u. Once again, this issue
is often left ambiguous in their writings 15. However, if we as
theorists proclaim social actors' beliefs to be unwarranted or
illogical or invalid, the onus rests on us to give reasons for our
argument, and explain whether historical actors could possibly have
been expected to think differently about things, given their social
context and the knowledge available to them.
Ultimately, the critique offered by discourse-theorists remains
ambiguous. Why are dominant ideologies offensive? Is it (1) that
these beliefs have an (intended or unintended) effect on power
structures, or (2) that actors' beliefs promote certain interests,
or (3) that their beliefs promote illegitimate interests, or (4)
that actors' have mistaken beliefs? Or is it simply that (5) the
fact that powerful, and often arrogant and unpleasant, people hold
these beliefs? Thus far, theorists in the radical tradition tend
to cultivate an attitude of cynical reason, a *hermeneutics of
suspicion' without taking the trouble to spell out exactly what
14
. Adam Ashforth's critique of segregationists' claims to
expertise and rationality in problem-solving is a good
example of this. He implies throughout that their
expertise was not genuine, although he never tells us
why (Ibid., p. 6).
15
. For example, Deborah Posel uses the term ^ideology' in
two different ways. On the one hand, the definition of
ideology as * vehicles for the constitution of
subjectivity' is a value-neutral one, referring simply
to a set of beliefs which have profound meaning for us
(p. 438) . Presumably, on this account, we all operate
within * ideologies'; if this is the case, then, there
are no objective ways of choosing between different
ideologies. On the other hand, her discussion of
apartheid as an ideology implies that it was false, in
some sense. For example, Posel claims that ^Apartheid
was thus vaunted as the only moral Christian course for
South African polities'(p. 433). Presumably we are not
to give apartheid ideology the benefit of the doubt, even
if it constituted Afrikaners' subjectivity as much as our
beliefs constitute our own.
we should be cynical about 16.
Implicitly, the diffuse critiques of discourse-theorists (and
radical theorists generally) have led to a neurotic
disagreeableness about political life, based on a subterranean
anger about the role of interests and and power in politics 17
Because these theorists are unable to pinpoint exactly what the
real problem with society is, these unfocused critiques have tend
to produce their mirror image - a political utopianism, where
politics is stripped of power (or eliminated altogether) , where
beliefs are freed of interests, and where discourse becomes a
transparent window on truth 18. These difficulties are not limited
to discourse-theorists alone; they stem from the entire tradition
of revisionist theory, which took refuge in an endless ^critique
mode' 19, without ever providing a coherent standard by which
political (and economic) activity could be sensibly evaluated.
Because they did not have a viable conception of political life,
they ended up by blaming politics for being politics.
What is desperately necessary in South African political analysis,
is a better understanding of political conduct per se. Such an
appreciation which would recognise the quest for power and the
pursuit of interests as normal and legitimate, but nevertheless
limited dimensions of politics conduct - a recognition which would
leave significant place for the other dimensions of politics, most
notably political meaning and morality.
There are indications that *discourse-theorists' are aware of the
. The problem finds its origin in Marx's critique of
ideology. It is never clear whether Marx criticises
ideology on the grounds that it promotes interests, or
on the grounds that it promotes illegitimate interests,
or on the grounds that it is false. On the ambiguities
in Marx's theory of ideology, see N. Abercrombie et al.,
The Dominant Ideology Thesis, London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1980; chapter 1.
17
. The radical historians are not alone in this regard.
Michel Foucault displays the same anger at the ubiquity
of power in society. Unlike South African revisionists,
however, Foucault finds it difficult to conceive of a
better society.
18
. Ashforth approaches this utopianism when he refers to a
better world of Apolitical processes wherein humans of
all kinds might freely speak for themselves and act
conjointly in pursuit of visions of a more desirable
community' (Ibid.. p. 63).
19 I am endebted to Khehla. Shubane for this term.
8limitations of their approach. Saul Dubow, for example,
tantalisingly refers to xthe ethic and style of government, the
living assumptions of administrative officials', and the moral
justifications offered by segregationists 20, but these are not
explored at all. Deborah Posel makes the useful suggestion that
the manipulatory dimension of discourse is properly a matter of
empirical proof, not an a priori assumption. In addition, her
distinction between * languages - of legitimation' (which are
consciously employed by social actors to further certain interests)
and * ideologies' which genuinely shape the identity and meaning of
individuals, is a fruitful one .
I am not making a realist claim in a new guise. I do not maintain
that there is a hidden reality of which social actors are unaware.
Rather, it is an argument for the ubiquity of political morality,
and that any meaningful discourse always constitutes social actors
in a moral way. Ironically, it is only by taking political
morality seriously that we can appreciate both the importance and
the limitations of power and Machiavellianism in political conduct.
Politics can be reduced neither to morality nor to power. I will
explore the implications of these claims in the rest of the paper.
It is only then, I maintain, that we can begin to make sense of the
nature of community and citizenship in our cities.
B. The nature and importance of political morality
In political and social life, people's motives are extremely
complex and diverse. People engage in politics for many different
reasons, ranging from enjoyment, novelty, conformity, thrill and
self-fulfilment, to the pursuit of power or morally-defined goals.
The public world cannot be reduced to private material interests
22
. Furthermore, political activity itself helps to define people's
individuality, their identities, and the self-understanding of
communities . Political activities are forms of human
20
. S. Dubow, Ibid., pp. 14 and 26.
21
. D. Posel, *Ibid'; pp. 428 and 438. Unfortunately, her
discussion of technocratic discourse as a manipulatory
language of legitimation does not go far enough; it
fails to explore the very real moral dimension of
technocratic meaning, which involves an important (and
often quite heart-felt) redefinition of rights,
obligations and meanings on the part of social actors.
22
. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. New York: Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1959; p. 48.
23
. B. Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New
Political Philosophy. London: Macmillan, 1981; p. 54.
sociability; hence they do not only make sense in terms of their
consequences, but also as important expressions of inter-subjective
meaning.
An indispensable part of human sociability is moral life 24. All
actions are intrinsically moral, not because we judge them to be
virtuous (they often are not), but because they always take place
within a social framework of meaning and notions of justice. (The
only exceptions are the actions of psychopaths) . All normal social
conduct is structured by rules, and by notions of rights,
obligations and appropriateness. *A11 properly social relations
are moral and customary' 25.
It is necessary, therefore, to attempt to disentangle the concept
of Apolitical morality' itself. At least five characteristics can
be pinpointed:
a) Morality and custom; Political morality does not
simply consist of lofty and abstract principles. Political
morality involves diffuse patterns of social obligations and
decencies, including *absolute prohibitions, elementary decencies,
the recognition of a plurality of prohibitions which do not all
serve a single purpose' 26. The rituals, good manners and social
mores of a society help to define more abstract principles of
political morality 27. To understand a persons' choices, we need
to empathise with his or her entire Weltanschauung. Our morality
arises from dense personal experience, and our choices are often
taken absent-mindedly, or by intuition.
b) Morality and institutional context: Institutions
involve shared dispositions and mutual expectations . The
institutional constraints on political and governmental actors have
consequences for their moral sensibility. For example, they are
often morally encapsulated in their roles, shielded from the
24
. It is worth emphasising here that a discussion of the
morality of social actions does not imply an approval of
those actions.
25
. John Plamenatz, Man and Society (Vol. 2 ) , London:
Longman, 1963; p. 283.
26
. Stuart Hampshire, ^Morality and Pessimism 7, in S.
Hampshire (ed), Public and Private Morality. Cambridge
University Press, 1978; p. 15.
27
. Stuart Hampshire, ^Public and private morality', in S.
Hampshire, ed, Ibid.. p. 26.
28
. Bernard Williams, ^Politics and moral character', in S.
Hampshire (ed), Ibid., p. 64.
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consequences of their actions. Also, official roles tend to
justify actions which would be impermissible from the point of view
of individual morality . Bureaucratic cultures entail a certain
style of political morality, e.g. standards of moral debate, or the
a certain style of trade-off between means and ends.
c) Moral conflicts: Social actors often experience moral
problems as quite intractable. The application of a moral
principle to a specific practical problem is often not a simple
matter. For one thing, problems yield themselves to very different
interpretations 30; and must then evaluated in terms of a
perplexing array of moral prescriptions. Especially in politics,
actors may be torn between the moral claims entailed by political
effectiveness and those which apply to private life, such as
scrupulous honesty and integrity .
d) Moral choice; Because moral choices are not self-
evident, social actors have to make up their own minds, using their
own information and moral sensibilities. This point is important,
in order to temper our sociologistic inclinations towards social
determinism and causal analysis - an inclination which may, on
occasion, tempt us to excuse cases of moral abdication 32. Moral
dilemmas are a part of life, and can produce unpredictable results
- ranging from extraordinary moral grandeur, on the one hand, to
moral lapses and even betrayal, on the other.
d) Moderation and extremism in political morality:
Moderation and extremism are different forms of moral commitment.
At stake is the relationship between means and ends in political
conduct. Moderation is the acception of moral limits in the choice
of means to achieve a political end, whereas extremism is the
willingness to use exceptional means (which often justify the ends
being pursued, e.g. the use of war to achieve peace). Moderation
involves an awareness of a plurality of possible and reasonable
29
. Thomas Nagel, *Ruthlessness in public life', in S.
Hampshire (ed), Ibid.. p. 79.
30
. W.H. Walsh, *0pen and closed morality', in B. Parekh and
R.N. Berki (ed) , The Morality of Politics. London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1972; p. 27.
31
. s. Hampshire, *Public and private morality', in S.
Hampshire (ed), Ibid., p. 42.
32
. For example, when we argue that political actors'
breaches of morality must be excused on account of their
deprived background, intellectual isolation, etc. While
it is crucial that their social circumstances be taken
into account, we should also recognise that political
decisions almost invariably involve moral choices.
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ends, whereas extremism tends to fasten on one overriding end 33.
It may be noted that neither moderation nor extremism has a priori
superior moral worth.
e) Morality. Machiavelli and 'dirtv hands'; Machiavelli's
understanding of politics contains the following three claims: (1)
Public policy often involves greater resonsibility than private
actions, because it has more far-reaching consequences; (2) the
occasional use of force or other unpalatable methods is a normal
part of government; and (3) in modern politics (especially a
democracy) political actors are reasonably required to protect the
interests of those represented, whether they be fellow party
members, a social group, or fellow citizens. According to
Machiavelli, it is irresonsible to apply to political action the
moral standards appropriate to private life. A certain measure of
ruthlessness, deceit, guile, promise-breaking and force are normal
in politics - especially when it is felt that certain beneficial
consequences will justify unethical means. It is worth noting,
especially in the light of my criticisms of revisionists, that the
notion of * interests' is certainly an indispensable theoretical
tool in political analysis - my only reservation is that we should
know when to stop wielding it.
Machiavelli's claims are both indispensable and limited. They do
not imply that ^anything goes'. To be truly effective in politics,
Machiavellianism in politics must take moral limits into account.
Politics generally involves both political seriousness (the use of
power) and moral seriousness, decencies and sensitivities. This
moral caution stems from two sources: (1) Intelligent political
actors are usually aware that unethical means may have undesirable
political consequences; and (2) political actors are also social
beings, steeped in their society's norms of decent conduct.
C. Political morality and the construction of moral
communities
At this point, we need to begin to look at South African politics
from a new vantage point. So far, we have emphasised the
importance of political morality in the realm of public life; in
the process, we also emphasised the importance of inter-subjective
meaning and sociability in the constitution of political morality.
Morality is a communal affair. Communities are deeply permeated
with shared moral preconceptions; it is in this sense, then, that
we can talk of *moral communities'.
33
. R. N. Berki, *The distinction between Boderation and
extemism', in B. Parekh and R.N. Berki (eds), Ibid.; p.
66.
12
One further key factor in social integration is the degree to which
people share the same kind of moral sensitivities (even though they
may disagree on specific moral principles). According to W.H.
Walsh, communities often have *closed' systems of morality, in
which certain moral virtues and expectations are postulated for
one' s own community. Any harmful effect of their actions on
outsiders is often deemed regrettable, but not to the extent that
their actions will be condemned u. Walsh warns us not to
exaggerate the prevalence of genuinely universalistic moral
principles in ordinary social life.
Another way of making the same point is to contrast Kantian with
Hegelian ethics. Whereas the Kantian notion of ethics postulates
universalistic rules which should apply irrespective of the social
characteristics of persons, we could usefully adopt a more Hegelian
approach, which emphasises that morality is intrinsically social
. We should analyse ethical life as vested in the established
norms, ideals and self-interpretations that constitute an ongoing
communal life. This is an essentially hermeneutic method of
understanding political morality: We must start from a
1
 reconstruction of the shared conceptions of citizenship and of
social co-operation...'
How does this cast light on the South African experience? The
arguments of Hegel and Walsh imply a coherent and shared sense of
identity and community amongst individuals. In practical
situations, however, such an assumption is not always appropriate.
Communal identity may be under threat, thus causing widespread
social anxiety.
In situations of rapid social change, communal solidarities tend
to break down, leading to severe existential anxiety: xWhen we
see individuals defending an ideology it is often because they
believe that the alternative is chaos, an undoing of themselves as
34
. W.H. Walsh, *Open and closed morality', in B. Parekh and
R.N. Berki (eds), Ibid.: pp.19 and 24,
35
. This discussion is based on Paul stern, *0n the relation
between rational autonomy and ethical community: Hegel's
critique of Kantian morality', in Praxis International,
vol. 9, no. 3, 1989.
36
. P. Stern, %Ibid', p. 245. For this reason, it is simply
inappropriate to evaluate the political ethics of
historical actors with some abstractly derived system of
universalistic morality - a tendency which implicitly
informs much of revisionist and post-revisionist writing
in South Africa.
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persons, the annihilation of their identity' . In such
situations, much of politics becomes concerned with maintaining or
imposing an identity system.
The native administrators in South African cities were, during the
1950s, the state's front line in coming to terms with urban change.
Unlike other whites, they were in constant close contact with black
residents, and were witnesses to the social distress and moral
decay prevalent in black townships- This, they believed, gave them
some authority in understanding the problems of townships, for they
had first-hand information of *the aspirations of the urban Native;
of his aspirations for home and family life and security; of his
frustrations in our economic framework; of his weakness due to his
backwardness and his limitations' 38.
Consequently, these officials were particularly prone to exercise
their minds about the problems of black townships. Dr. Language,
the Manager of Non-European Affairs in Brakpan, made eloquent
testimony of the
1
 ... harmful effects such as the tremendous wastage of
valuable time, of opportunities, of labour and of
capital, not to mention the threats to personal life and
safety and the ruination of family and of community life.
This is a problem affecting the social, economic,
administrative and religious institutions of the country
as a whole, including all living creatures - not even the
dumb animals in our locations escape injury and ill-
treatment' 39.
The ravages of modernisation had to be dealt with. The crucial
question was - how?
D. Modernity, discipline and categorisation
In this regard, Michel Foucault's analysis of modernity becomes
very useful. Foucault has drawn attention to the peculiar ways in
which power operates in modern society. Instead of a repressive
notion of power, which emphasises concepts such as manipulation,
coercion, and domination, Foucault has introduced a ^productive'
understanding of power. Patterns of power structure the roles of
all members of society, thereby producing crucial identities and
37 P. Du Preez, Ibid., p. 48.
38
. Mr. J. Matthewson, Native Administrator of Benoni, IANA
Annual Conference Proceedings, 1953; p. 47.
39
. Address to Institute of Administrators of Non-European
Affairs (IANA), 1954; Conference Proceedings, p. 32.
14
motives through processes of * self-formation or autocolonization'40.
For Foucault, modern societies are characterised by ^disciplinary'
power - the division of society into formal categories; the minute
attentions paid to each individual; the uninterrupted surveillance
which ensured proper and enthusiastic performance; and the use of
scientific knowledge with which to diagnose society's ills. A
crucial point is that discipline is not something done by one actor
(or group of actors) to another. It is reciprocally exerted -
^supervisors, perpetually supervised -..' . It is an impulse
towards social order which encompasses government and governed
alike.
All this presupposes the development of numerous valid social
categories in which to classify members of society (including, for
example, residence, age, education, citizenship, military
obligations, and taxation status). The crucial point is that there
are no classifications that are a priori appropriate to the
imposition of discipline. While Foucault is correct to emphasise
the need for classification, the content of such classifications
is a practical problem for each specific historical context.
The problem in South Africa has been precisely the difficulty of
delineating appropriate categories, with the result that the
imposition of disciplinary power has proven extremely confusing to
political elites as well as ordinary people. South Africa in the
twentieth century has consisted of a bewildering combination of
languages, cultures, classes, degrees of urbanisation, and modes
of acculturation to the rising giant of capitalism. These problems
bedevilled the universal application of disciplinary techniques by
government and non-government agencies alike.
To put this matter in the terms of our discussion on political
morality: in the context of ambiguous moral communities in South
Africa, the application of appropriate standards of moral conduct
to different groups of people was a hazardous affair. Different
moral communities, delineated by racial, linguistic, class and
other divisions, have co-existed in uncomfortable proximity. They
are often not quite insulated from one another, and certain moral
outlooks have, on occasion, overlapped with one another. The
result is that political actors have had to constantly navigate the
boundaries between moral communities, with only the fragile
signposts of their own moral preconceptions to guide them.
60
. H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. University of Chicago
Press, 1983; p. 186.
A1
. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage
Books, 1977; p. 177.
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The crucial point is that, in a context of shifting boundaries
between communities, the question of appropriate rights and
obligations becomes highly problematic in practice. Different
conceptions of moral decency and appropriateness exist. Hence
social actors not only have to make sense of the shifting fortunes
of their own community in times of rapid change, but with the
relatively alien cultural institutions of other communities living
nearby. This produces an extremely complex social and moral
universe, in which mistakes and misinterpretations become very
likely. And when people's conceptions of their own identity and
worth are infringed, it causes distress, hurt, and confusion -
occasionally with explosive results.
In South African cities, the notion of the *urban community' has
been a particularly problematic one. One can regard the history
of the city in South Africa as the history of (generally
unsuccessful) attempts by local and central government actors to
resolve the ambiguities of local community membership 4Z. The key
question was, of course, the following: In what ways were black
residents part of the *urban community'? Should the black
community be seen as internally homogenous (a moral community in
its own right) , or does a certain sector of black residents truly
belong to the established urban community? In studying the meaning
of *the city' in the history of South Africa, we need to recognise
the intrinsically normative and emotive dimensions of community
feeling as distinctly public questions that cannot be reduced to
private sentiments.
E. Political morality and urban communities during the
1950s: The question of paternalism
So far, we have simply prepared some theoretical ground for a new
approach to the understanding of the urban community in South
Africa. For the rest of this paper, we will attempt to apply this
approach to a specific problem: The definition of the South
African urban polity during the 1950s. Our discussion will of
necessity be brief, and is intended to be an introduction to future
work. It will simply focus on the way in which white officials and
City Councillors perceived their moral relationship with black
urban residents.
It is extremely difficult to portray the exact quality of this
moral relationship. I will describe it using three different
conceptions of moral relationship, viz. * paternalism', ^patriarchy'
and (for lack of a better term) *proto-liberalism'.
42
. I believe it was also a matter of some debate within the
black community itself. However, that would be the
subject of another paper.
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a) Paternalism
Paternalism refers to a certain kind of moral justification for
specific actions . It can be defined as intervention by a
paternalist (say A) in the liberty of a subject (say S) , in such
a way that A's motive is concern for S's welfare. A's actions may
take place without the consent of S, and may involve unpalatable
actions, such as the use of force, coercive threat, or manipulation
44
. It may be noted that specific altruistic and paternalistic
actions are quite compatible with broader patterns of exploitation;
however, it is a mistake to regard paternalism simply as a mask of
exploitation.
There are, in fact, numerous valid ways in which paternalism can
be justified morally: (1) It is often the case that A claims to
have some expert knowledge which legitimises his or her
interference; (2) A may believe (rightly or wrongly) that the
desirable consequences of his or her action will outweigh the
unpleasant means employed; (3) A may believe that S does not have
the intellectual or psychological competence to promote her own
best interests; and (4) A may claim that S had consented in the
past, or will do so retrospectively in the future 4S. In the words
of an advocate of paternalism: *lf ... the object ained a t is good,
if the compulsion employed is such as to attain it, and if the good
obtained overbalances the inconvenience of the compulsion itself,
I do not understand how, upon utilitarian principles, the
compulsion can be bad' .
43
. In this regard, I use the term differently from, say,
Eugene Genovese's Roll. Jordan. Roll: The World the
Slaves Made, New York: Vintage Books, 1976; or Charles
van Onselen, *The social and economic underpinnings of
paternalism and violence on the maize farms of the South-
Western Transvaal, 1900-1950; ASI Seminar Paper, 13 May
1991. These authors use the term ^paternalism' in a more
diffuse way, to refer to an *ethos' or a Relationship'
or a * regime'. These uses are not wrong; but I feel
that my act-based definition is more useful for my
purposes.
44
. This definition is drawn from Donald VanDeVeer,
• Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on
Benevolence. Princeton University Press, 1986; p. 22.
45
. D. VanDeVeer, Ibid, p. 67; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism:
Some second thoughts', in R. Sartorius (ed) , Paternalism.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983; p. 107.
46
. J. Fitzj ames Stephen, quoted in R. Sartorius,
sIntroduction', in Sartorius (ed), Ibid.; p. xi.
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The concept of paternalism brings us some way to understanding the
pecualiar relationship between the white *city fathers' and black
residents of South African cities during the 1950s. White
officials frequently introduced measures which, they believed, were
to the benefit of black residents, regardless of the latter's
opposition.
We must be clear, however, what the concept of paternalism actually
explains in our case study of the cities. The paternalistic
quality of certain actions invariably refer back to the
characteristics of moral conduct outlined above. For example,
officials' paternalistic actions involved, inter alia: the
existence of morally-based motives; the norms of social decency
which the paternalist intuitively subscribed to; the institutional
context which encouraged paternalistic officials to justify actions
normally impermissible in private life; moral conflicts and
choices; and the need to reconcile paternalism with the
Machiavellian predilection to *dirty one's hands'. In any specific
case study, these dimensions of paternalism could serve as
guideposts for investigation.
b) Patriarchalism
For the white city fathers, intervention in the liberties of black
residents was not an occasional affair. They also often assumed
that black residents would generally consent to their
interventions. Paternalistic acts occurred against a more
pervasive moral structure, which we will term *patriarchalism'.
VanDeVeer's definition is admirably succint:
*The term "patriarch" in ancient times referred to a male
ruler, typically a venerated elder- A community
hierarchically organized with such.persons having supreme
do facto authority is called "patriarchal" . . . Such
"authorities control others. Whether for their own good
... is a further question. In addition, whether
patriarchs exercised control with altruistic aims ... is
an open question. There is, then, no necessary
connection between "acting in a patriarchal fashion11 and
"acting paternalistically" 47.
In other words, paternalistic acts may take place in a non-
patriarchal social structure, and a patriarchal structure may exist
without altruistic or paternalistic acts on the part of the
patriarch 48.
47 D. VanDeVeer, Ibid.. p. 23. My emphasis.
in fact, * reverse paternalism' may take place in a
patriarchal context; the mother or sons may, for
example, conspire to intervene in the circumstnaces of
18
It is important to note that patriarchalism is not a morally
irrational system. There are several possible justifications for
patriarchalism. The family represents ethical life based on
feeling and intimacy; the individual is assured of belonging;
and there is little place for the loneliness and alienation found
in more individualistic contexts. Clear, ascriptive patterns of
authority may be experienced as preferable to the diffuse,
competitive authority patterns which characterise individualistic
societies . If such characteristics are carried over t o a social
setting, these justifications may appear quite attractive to
certain parts of people's psyche. However, on the negative side,
there is little room for privacy and individualistic rights in the
family (although there may be other kinds of rights),
In patriarchal contexts, the parents have a moral duty to teach
their children about ethics. This education process invariably
has a harsh dimension: ^Children are punished less because they
deserve punishment than in order to be made moral; they are not
only taught by precept and example, they are also taught by the
infliction of pain' . In a well-functioning patriarchy, such
coercion is accepted as legitimate by a child. Once again it is
necessary to differentiate between acts and structures: a child
may resent specific paternalistic acts, while consenting to the
patriarchal structure in general. It is in this light that white
city fathers in South African towns understood their moral
relationship with black residents.
c) Proto-liberalism
The complexity of the moral relationship between vhite officials
and black residents does not, however, end with paternalism and
patriarchy. In the light of rapidly changing social circumstances,
there was an inherent ambiguity in the application of these
principles to a confusing world. Many officials recognised
appropriate limits of paternalism and patriarchy. Blacks' status
was. never simply that of ^children', unlike the slave societies of
the American South. There were two reasons for this. First, the
the patriarch for his own good - usually, one would
imagine, without his knowledge.
49
. Hegel's comments on the family as ethical unit are quite
insightful in this regard. See John Plaaenatz, Man and
Society (Vol. 2 ) , London: Longman, 1963, pp. 231-235. In
Hegel's terms, the family is the sphere of particularity,
difference and locality; as opposed to the universality
of rights in civil society.
50
. See Plamenatz's discussion of Hegel's theory of the
family, Ibid; p. 244.
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remnants of erstwhile independent black polities meant that blacks
were not intrinsically childlike. Secondly, the existence of a
well-educated, articulate Western sector in black townships created
difficulties for a doctrine of patriarchalism. The result was a
diffuse awareness amongst officials that (some) blacks had claim
to individualistic rights and to treatment as formal equals. In
the patriarchal metaphor, blacks were *growing up'.
This produced exactly the kinds of anxieties about the nature of
the moral community described above. The assumptions of patriarchy
were being challenged:
*•..[T]he urban Bantu harboured many grievances for a
variety of reasons: a feeling of desperation, of no
trust in the white man and of utter frustration was
evident among the educated, and in some instances the
Bantu demonstrated against the European and force had to
be used to quell disturbances...'51.
If blacks were ^growing up', what kind of adults were they going
to become? Once again, Dr. Language expressed the problem
succinctly: *I must admit that a substitute for the lost community
pride and discipline for which the traditional Bantu were so
renowned still has to be found' 5Z.
The problem with social patriarchy is that the familial metaphor
does not transpose neatly to social life. What exactly constitutes
a social xfamily'? Amongst the confusion which characterised white
officials' deliberations, at least three possibilities can be
discerned - all of which made sense from the background of
patriarchalism and paternalism.
The first option was the development of a xdual patriarchy', in
which blacks did not belong in the cities at all. Black people
would rightfully belong to a moral community situated in the rural
areas, where a legitimate black patriarchy was entrenched. On this
view, the location in the town was simply a tribal enclave; it was
an urban component of a fundamentally different social order.
Black people were in the towns, but they were not of the towns.
This was the view propounded by Verwoerdian officials.
The second option was the development of a %dual and equal
patriarchy' within the cities themselves. This involved the
development of a black leadership structure within the locations
themselves. This option allowed for white paternalism in the
training of black members of Advisory Boards, until the Boards
reached full autonomy. Ultimately, the relationship between white
51
 • Dr. Lanaguage, Address to IANA, 1954; p. 180.
52
. Address to IANA, Conference Proceedings, 1957; p. 32.
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city fathers and black Advisory Boards would resemble the
relationship between two autonomous families, who sould interact
with one another on an equal footing. Each may well continue to
have patriarchal structures within themselves. In the words of
Prof. Coetzee of Potchefstroom University,
[ ] will have to realise ... that we will not always be able
to choose the Bantu's leaders for him; they must develop
their own leaders, and it will largely depend on us whether
we will be able to co-operate with them in a friendly,
beneficial and responsible way' •
A third option was that of *dual but unequal patriarchy'. This
scenario would resemble the relationship between a patriarch and
his adult son, who had established his own family, in this case,
a high degree of mutual respect would exist alongside a permanent
relationship of equality. Mr. Matthewson of Benoni, for example,
did not consider a transfer of power to Advisory Boards to be
crucial to their functioning. He maintained that Board members
simply wanted some prestige and respectability. Any decent white
City Council would look after black residents' interests, and take
into account the Board's views on such matters. It was just a
question of finding the right attitude and mechanisns to make this
relationship work .
The last option reflected the beginnings of an attitude of proto-
liberalism, described earlier. This view can also be construed as
a xdual and temporary patriarchy'. According to this view, it
black residents were on the road to Westernisation and multi-
racialism. They did not enjoy equal formal rights with white
residents, but they had the intellectual and moral capacities to
be recognised as equal citizens in the future 55.
CONCLUSION
Against the background of ambiguous patriarchal structures, moral
conduct became a highly complex affair for white officials.
Municipal administrators were usually busy and dedicated men; they
were not philosophers. Paternalist actions were usually enveloped
by other practical preoccupations about administration, housing,
53
. IANA Annual Conference Proceedings, 1957; p . 113.
54
. IANA Annual Conference Proceedings, 1953; p . 39-40.
55
. Mr. Bourquin of Durban represented this view when he
acknowledged the hurtful nature of racial discrimination
(IANA, 1957; p. 45) . His statement only makes sense
when discrimination is seen as arbitrary treatment of
essentially similar people in dissimilar ways.
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or the never-ending worry about finance. Paternalism was not an
explicit doctrine; it did not even offer clear criteria of
practical success or moral virtue. It was a muddled guiding
sentiment, partly coercive, partly humane, often contradictory,
which at least allowed its proponents some sense of moral decency
while fighting a hopeless battle to improve the increasingly
squalid township conditions.
Paternalism is a typical example of political morality. Its
prescriptions are ambiguous, and there is always room for moral
choices, which can be resolved anywhere on a scale from absolute
virtue to total Machiavellianism. Most political or governmental
actors make use of this entire range, at some tine or other in
their careers.
What is unusual about the paternalism of the white city fathers of
the 1950s, however, was the extraordinary ambiguities about the
structure of the patriarchal moral community itself. The result
was that each locality developed its own understanding of white and
black patriarchy, and therefore developed its own bureaucratic
ethos. In this way, South African towns indeed reflected the
principles of locality and particularity, which, according to
Hegel, characterise family structures. The unresolved moral
community meant that local government was simply not conducive to
universalist bureaucratic principles, dictated formally from a
remote central government.
In the meantime, the urgency of social improvements was seldom lost
from sight. Something had to be done; and this usually resulted
in makeshift rules, regulations, prohibitions, permissions, permits
and prosecutions. Frequently, as a last resort, officials had to
turn to coercion and deception - often in the name of paternalistic
improvements. This was not always an easy way out. Consciences
were bothered, and endless debates took place about means and ends.
Under the patriarchal system of native administration in the 1950s,
the web of control in the cities was not nearly as systematic and
confident as authors in the radical tradition tend to claim. At
best, it was an attempt to apply a modernizing disciplinary spirit
to a fundamentally ambiguous situation. It is this inherent
contradictoriness that differentiated patriarchal control and
paternalistic intervention ism from the more totalitarian controls
introduced by the Verwoerdians, who were as yet only gathering
their strength.
